57 HOUS. L. REV. 593 (2020)

ARTICLE
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FORENSICS
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ABSTRACT
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote that
states can be laboratories for experimentation in law and policy.
Disappointingly, however, the actual laboratories that states and
local governments run are not a home for experimentation. We do
not have adequate information about either the costs or the
benefits of forensic testing or allocation of resources. Increased
spending and expansion of crime laboratories has perversely
accompanied growing backlogs. Poor quality control has resulted
in a series of audits and even closures of crime laboratories. In
response to these problems, however, some laboratories and some
entire states have developed new approaches toward oversight. In
this Article, I will describe the growth of crime labs and the
resources dedicated to them, but also the backlogs that have
resulted from far too much in the way of quantity. Second, I will
discuss the problem of resource allocation in forensics, including
the differing perspectives and interests of police and forensic
agencies that should both be taken into account. Third, I will
describe quality control challenges that have accompanied the
explosion in the use of forensics. Fourth, I will describe how
regulation could better address both resource allocation and
quality control, as well as how the Houston Forensic Science
Center has become a model for regulating both the quality and the
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quantity of forensics. Finally, I will ask why the federal
government has not done more to help improve the quality of
forensics even as it has helped to encourage overwhelming and
unnecessary quantity.
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INTRODUCTION

Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, in one of his bestknown passages, described how states can be laboratories for
experimentation in law and policy: “It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”1
Crime laboratories were barely in existence at the time.
Disappointingly, today, the actual laboratories that states and
localities run are not a home for experimentation.2 We do not have
adequate information about either the costs or the benefits of
forensic testing or allocation of resources for forensic evidence.3
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). For more information on the themes in this Article, see BRANDON L. GARRETT,
AUTOPSY OF A CRIME LAB: HOW FAULTY SCIENCE LEADS TO INJUSTICE (forthcoming Nov.
2020).
2. See generally Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a
Systemic View of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051 (2013)
(discussing the challenges faced by state crime laboratories).
3. The field of forensic science is “the application of scientific or technical practices
to the recognition, collection, analysis, and interpretation of evidence for criminal and civil
law or regulatory issues.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC
VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 1 (2016) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT],
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Increased spending and expansion of crime laboratories has
perversely accompanied growing backlogs. Poor quality control
has resulted in a series of audits, scandals, and even closures of
crime laboratories.4
Failure to link a set of fingerprints to a string of burglaries,
or failure to link DNA to a single homicide, could result in crime
that costs residents millions of dollars in damage and social costs
that are difficult to fully assess. The costs of a wrongful conviction
can be greater. Take the case of George Rodriguez, who was
wrongfully convicted in Harris County, Texas based on erroneous
serology and microscopic hair comparison testimony. Following his
exoneration by post-conviction DNA testing, the jury in his civil
rights case awarded him $5 million in compensation. The case
later settled for $3.1 million, and he received another $1 million in
compensation from the State of Texas.5 That amount would pay
for many years of enhanced quality controls at the Houston lab,
which has, in response to errors, become independent of law
enforcement and made substantial investments in quality
controls.6 The costs of errors are not normally factored into the
management of a crime lab like they would be for a hospital.
More broadly, very little is known about whether spending
funds on forensic work is worthwhile, and if it is worthwhile, little
is known about the costs and benefits of different types of forensic
work. There is a larger focus on the social costs of policing
generally,7 and far too little is known about the costs and benefits
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_fore
nsic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCY4-3T7Z].
4. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 44–45 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT], https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/59PP-X864]; see also MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009); RADLEY BALKO & TUCKER CARRINGTON,
THE CADAVER KING AND THE COUNTRY DENTIST: A TRUE STORY OF INJUSTICE IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH 280 (2018); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic
Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2009).
5. George Rodriguez, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu
/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3591 [https://perma.cc/MD2Q-M3NJ]
(last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
6. Most crime laboratories, in contrast, are not independent, but rather operate as
divisions of law enforcement. See SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON, COPS IN LAB COATS:
CURBING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT FORENSIC LABORATORIES 181–
82 (2015).
7. See, e.g., Dan A. Black et al., Commentary, Comments on Domínguez and
Raphael, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 639, 641, 643 (2015); Patricio Domínguez & Steven
Raphael, The Role of the Cost-of-Crime Literature in Bridging the Gap Between Social
Science Research and Policy Making, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 589, 590, 603 (2015);
Charles F. Manski, Commentary, Narrow or Broad Cost-Benefit Analysis?,
14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 647, 649 (2015); Daniel S. Nagin, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
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of much of the public safety work done by police agencies.8 Because
it is scientific evidence, forensic science is often assumed to be
evidence-based and worthwhile; yet the same questions have not
been asked of forensics as have been asked (at least recently) in
the area of policing. We do not have measures of the social costs of
forensic testing or lack of forensic testing. Researchers have only
just begun to investigate these questions; police and crime
laboratories have largely been “flying blind.”9
The problems of resource allocation and quality control should
be seen as linked. Failure to test evidence and errors in testing
performed both create social harms. A lack of spending on quality
control can lead to costly forensic errors. Poor crime scene
collection, inexpensive testing that consumes evidence, or poor
resource allocation can result in unsolved crimes and harm to
victims. Forensic testing may cause police officers to prioritize
cases with testable evidence. New forensic technologies can be
extremely expensive but may have poorly understood accuracy
and efficacy. Use of forensic testing may impact privacy and cause
people not to engage in socially beneficial acts, but it may also
deter some types of criminal activity. We often do not know where
the costs may fall and do not ask. There is very little regulation of
forensic science of any kind, much less regulation informed by an
understanding of costs and benefits.10 Given limited resources, far
more work should be done to understand how to better prioritize
spending on forensics.11

Crime Prevention Policies, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 583, 585 (2015); Michael Tonry,
Commentary, The Fog Around Cost-of-Crime Studies May Finally Be Clearing: Prisoners
and Their Kids Suffer Too, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 653, 654–55, 659, 661, 666 (2015);
Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Commentary, Monetary Value of Early
Developmental Crime Prevention and Its Policy Significance, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
673, 674 (2015). See generally Steve Aos, Commentary, What Is the Bottom Line?, 14
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 633 (2015).
8. See generally Barry Friedman & Elizabeth G. Janszky, Policing’s Information
Problem 12 (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 19-39, 2019); Barry Friedman, We Spend $100 Billion on Policing. We Have No
Idea What Works, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017, 1:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/posteverything/wp/2017/03/10/we-spend-100-billion-on-policing-we-have-no-idea-what-wo
rks/ [https://perma.cc/4N6L-FVY8].
9. See, e.g., Roberta D. Julian et al., What Is the Value of Forensic Science? An
Overview of the Effectiveness of Forensic Science in the Australian Criminal Justice System
Project, 43 AUSTRALIAN J. FORENSIC SCI. 217, 220 (2011) (“[T]o a large extent, the policing
and forensic services community has been ‘flying blind’ in terms of the true impact of its
work. The time saved in an investigation by information and intelligence provided by
forensic examination and/or analyses is not known.”).
10. See Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to
Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 211–12 (2007); Nagin, supra note 7, at 585.
11. See Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground
up, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 292–93 (2014).
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In Part I of this Article, I describe the growth of crime labs
and the resources dedicated to them, but also the backlogs that
have resulted from far too much in the way of quantity. In Part II,
I discuss the resource allocation challenges that have accompanied
this explosion in the use of forensics, including those resulting
from divergent police and forensic crime laboratory interests.
Third, I discuss the different dimensions of quality control,
including accreditation, certification, blind testing, and
organizational psychology and human factors research. Fourth, I
describe how the Houston Forensic Science Center has in many
respects become a model for regulating both the quality and the
quantity of forensics. Finally, I ask why the federal government
has not done more to help improve the quality of forensics even as
it has helped to encourage overwhelming and unnecessary
quantity.
II. THE GROWTH OF CRIME LABS
In the early 1930s, when Justice Brandeis wrote about state
laboratories of experimentation, Los Angeles and Chicago (and a
few other major cities) had crime labs, largely created in response
to gangsters operating in the wake of Prohibition.12 Police officers
operated these labs, and they were small, handling hundreds of
cases a year—not the tens of thousands of cases a modern lab may
process.13 The newly-created Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Technical Crime Laboratory had just begun early efforts to
train federal agents to examine fingerprints, handwriting, and
ballistic evidence.14 The new FBI lab garnered early fame when
analysts performed high-profile work in the Charles Lindbergh
kidnapping case.15 In time, the FBI lab became the largest crime
lab in the country and the center of innovation and training on
forensics in the United States.16 However, many individual police
departments set up their own crime labs. By the 1960s, every state
had crime labs, although many were set up rapidly and with poor
equipment, staffing, and standards.17 Small “cop shops” within
police departments were run by beat police officers who were
12. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Why No Research?, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
503, 506–07 (2010) (describing how crime laboratories sprang up during the “gangster era”).
13. Id. at 507.
14. John F. Fox, Jr., The Birth of the FBI’s Technical Laboratory–1924 to 1935, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/history-publications-reports/the-birth-of-the-fbis-technical-lab
oratory1924-to-1935 [https://perma.cc/VVD5-ZCPL] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
15. Id.
16. Constance Holden, FBI Crime Lab Gets Physicist Director, 278 SCIENCE 809
(1997) (describing the FBI crime lab as the nation’s largest, with over 700 employees).
17. Giannelli, supra note 12, at 507–08.
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assigned to do forensics work. Today, more labs have people
trained in forensic science. There are police crime labs, regional
crime labs, crime labs that cover entire states, as well as private
crime labs.
We know far too little about the work that crime labs do. The
only national set of data that we have comes from several
researchers at the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), who
have conducted surveys of the publicly funded crime laboratories.
These data are reported by the labs themselves, and the surveys
are somewhat sporadic. Over time, the BJS reports have
documented a steady increase in lab size and funding. Today, there
are over 400 publicly funded crime labs.18 In 2002, there were
11,000 full-time personnel at crime labs; by 2009, there were about
13,000 and in 2014 there were 14,300.19 Crime labs expanded in
part due to drug enforcement efforts and accompanying demands
to conduct drug testing. Today, drug testing constitutes the largest
portion of what crime labs do. Roughly the other half of the work
of crime labs relates to identifying culprits and assessing how
crimes occurred. DNA testing constitutes only one-third of the
work requested of public crime laboratories, and despite federal
grant support, it continues to account for much of the backlog in
case processing.20
A. Growth in Crime Lab Spending
The personnel expansion at crime labs was, unsurprisingly,
accompanied by larger budgets. In 2014, the budgets totaled $1.7
billion.21 A new BJS survey is overdue; perhaps by 2020, these
budgets will have topped $2 billion. How are these labs funded,
exactly? Local labs may be funded through local law enforcement
with support from state funds and federal grants.22 State labs may
similarly receive funding as part of law enforcement
appropriations, but also through grant funding.23 Some
laboratories provide lawmakers with fairly detailed reports
18. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 250151,
PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES: RESOURCES AND SERVICES, 2014, at 1
(2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pffclrs14.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW3A-MRTB].
19. Id. at 5.
20. See id. at 3.
21. Id. at 5.
22. See, e.g., GERALD LAPORTE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251445, FISCAL
YEAR 2017 FUNDING FOR DNA ANALYSIS, CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT, AND OTHER FORENSIC
ACTIVITIES (2018) (describing federal grants to local crime labs), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/251445.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR3U-B7HD].
23. See id. at 1–3.
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describing budget needs, past spending, and future projections.
The Virginia Department of Forensic Services is one example.24
Substantial federal grants have made growth in crime labs
possible. Congress and federal agencies have awarded hundreds of
millions of dollars in grants to eliminate backlogs, purchase new
equipment, and expand DNA testing to add more information to
federal DNA databanks.25 Best known is the Paul Coverdell
Forensic Science Improvement Grants Program.26 In the 2004
Justice for All Act, Congress sought to reduce backlogs in DNA
testing with half a billion dollars in funding; that section of the law
was called the Debbie Smith Act, named after a Virginia woman
who had to wait six years for DNA testing to be done in her sexual
assault case.27 Those federal grants have continued. For example,
just in October 2017, the Department of Justice announced $119
million in grants to fund crime laboratories.28
Additional funding for state and local labs can come from fees
charged to defendants in criminal cases. In some states, all
criminal defendants are initially charged a small fixed fee (say
$50) for DNA testing and will thereafter be charged a much larger
fee (say $600) if a DNA test is actually conducted in connection
with their case. That money may go directly to the crime lab or to
the state’s general operating budget from which the crime labs
24. See LINDA C. JACKSON, VA. DEP’T OF FORENSIC SCI., REPORT TO HOUSE
APPROPRIATIONS PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMITTEE (2019), http://hac.virginia.gov/subcomm
ittee/public_safety/files/1-10-19/II%20-%20DFS%20Report%20to%20House%20Appropriat
ions%20Jan2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R8U-7XSW].
25. For an overview, see Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 757, 780–82 (2016).
26. See Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-561, § 2(c), 114 Stat. 2787, 2788–91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). Grants pursuant to that program can be used for backlog reduction; they may
also be available for efforts to address “emerging forensic science issues,” such as statistics
or new technology. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1121-0329,
PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENTS GRANTS PROGRAM – FORMULA (2019),
https://nij.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh171/files/media/document/NIJ-2019-15503.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/7BCE-5RJX].
27. See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, §§ 201–202, 118 Stat. 2260,
2266 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135) (2012)); see also Tom Jackman, Advocates
Implore Congress to Reauthorize Funds for Rape Kits Before Sept. 30 Expiration, WASH.
POST (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2019/09/07/advocatesimplore-congress-reauthorize-funds-backlogged-dna-rape-kits-before-sept-expiration/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/BKR3-L4A7].
28. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Awards More Than $119
Million to Boost Forensic Science (Oct. 4, 2017). The National Institute of Justice
distributes DNA backlog and capacity grants. See DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog
Reduction Program, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (July 17, 2019), https://nij.gov/topics/forensics/laboperations/evidence-backlogs/pages/backlog-reduction-program.aspx [https://perma.cc/U2
RL-JMRA].
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receive funding.29 The fees, however, may not be a predictable
funding stream; many criminal defendants cannot afford to pay
them. In North Carolina, payment of the required $600 fee for
certain forensic testing in criminal cases has steadily declined,
resulting in loss of revenue for the state crime lab.30 In other
states, criminal forfeiture is used to fund crime lab operations.31
B. Growth in Crime Lab Backlogs
Despite the federal grant funding designed to reduce backlogs
and the enactment of new statutes to provide new funding for
crime laboratories, laboratories often have not kept up with
demand. Indeed, scandals have resulted when it has come to light
that labs were backlogged and simply not testing evidence. The
Los Angeles Police Department is the best-known example, having
faced criticism for accidentally destroying over 1,000 rape kits, but
the same problems have occurred in other cities.32 In 2009, after a
Human Rights Watch report and public protests, the Los Angeles
County Police Department and Sheriff’s Department began to
work to address these backlogs. That review also uncovered that
despite receiving almost $4 million in federal grant funds for
backlog elimination, much of the funding remained unspent.33
Innocent people have been convicted (and some exonerated)
where lab analysts failed to test forensic evidence that could have
cleared them at the time of their trial. For example, in the case of
DNA exoneree Cody Davis, the ski mask worn by the robber was
not tested before Davis’s criminal trial in Florida due to backlogs
29. JUSTICE & PUB. SAFETY APPROPRIATIONS COMM., NORTH CAROLINA STATE CRIME
LABORATORY FY2015/2016 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2017), https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsit
es/committees/JointAppropriationsJPS/2017%20Session/2017-03-23%20State%20Crime%
20Lab/002%20DOJ_State_Crime%20Laboratory_FY_2015-2016_Annual_Report_Presenta
tion_2017_03-23.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6T6-6MD6]; John Stith, Judge Makes the Call on
DNA Fee Even If Defendant’s DNA Is in State Databank, Some Judges Require the Fee Be
Paid Again, POST-STANDARD, Apr. 8, 2007; Kirsten D. Levingston, The Cost of Staying out
of Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, at A11.
30. See JUSTICE & PUB. SAFETY APPROPRIATIONS COMM., supra note 29, at 11.
31. Paul Hammel, Feds Lift Freeze on Drug Forfeiture Money That’s Helping to Pay
for New $9 Million CrimeLab in Lincoln, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.omaha.com/news/state_and_regional/feds-lift-freeze-on-drug-forfeiture-mone
y-that-s-helping/article_214df8c9-4f65-501e-b100-277cf4b6d97e.html [https://perma.cc/79
KR-DCFT].
32. Tina Daunt, LAPD Blames Faulty Training in DNA Snafu, L.A. TIMES (July 31,
2002), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jul-31-me-dna31-story.html [https://
perma.cc/63T2-7NTQ].
33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TESTING JUSTICE: THE RAPE KIT BACKLOG IN LOS
ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY (2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/03/31/testing-justice/
rape-kit-backlog-los-angeles-city-and-county [https://perma.cc/NNT6-U7FC].
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at the lab. Four months after his trial, DNA results cleared Davis,
who was then exonerated.34
Perverse allocation of resources can explain these problems.
What happens when you give huge federal grants to reduce
backlogs? The result may be more backlogs. After all, labs that
eliminate backlogs can no longer qualify for the grants. Labs have
tested more and more DNA evidence to add to the federal
databases using federal funds. Like the federal government, states
have passed new laws requiring that DNA be collected from all
people arrested and convicted of a growing list of crimes.35
However, the backlog of requests for crime scene DNA analysis
actually grew between 2011 and 2017.36 In addition, federal money
prioritized DNA testing, and as discussed, such tests are only a
small part of the casework that labs actually do.37 Most of what
labs do is toxicology or DUI cases, controlled substances testing,
and fingerprint comparisons, which have not received the same
grant support.38 In recent years, particularly in response to the
opioid crisis, grant funds have been directed toward expanding
capacity in other disciplines.39 However, the federal DNA funding
policy has certainly not been a success; according to a 2019
Government Accountability Office report, after spending nearly a
billion dollars on DNA backlog elimination, backlogs grew by 85%
from 2011 to 2017.40 The report noted that despite initiatives to
uncover and reduce such backlogs, particularly in sexual assault
cases, it remains unknown just how many untested sexual assault
kits remain nationwide.41

34. Cody Davis, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/codydavis/ [https://perma.cc/GJ3Z-GN2X] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
35. DNA Arrestee Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Docum
ents/cj/ArresteeDNALaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH2M-37FZ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020);
NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41800, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAW, GRANTS, AND ISSUES 25 (2012).
36. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-216, DNA EVIDENCE: DOJ SHOULD
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND PROPERLY DESIGN CONTROLS FOR
NATIONWIDE GRANT PROGRAM 16 (2019) [hereinafter GAO, DNA EVIDENCE].
37. See supra text accompanying note 18; cf. CRIME LAB. REVIEW COMM’N, MO. DEP’T
OF PUB. SAFETY, 2018 ANNUAL REP. 8 (2019), https://dps.mo.gov/documents/2018-crime-labcomm-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6AX-LEQ2] (“While limited federal funding is
available to reduce DNA backlogs, sustainable funding is needed to address the backlogs in
other forensic disciplines such as firearms, drugs and toxicology.”).
38. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 18, at 3 (describing requests to publicly funded
crime labs; forensic biology casework accounted for 9% of requests).
39. See, e.g., Importance of Grant Funding!, IDAHO ST. POLICE (Oct. 21, 2018),
https://isp.idaho.gov/forensics/ [https://perma.cc/L6KG-D85M].
40. GAO, DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 36, at 1, 17.
41. Id. at 1.
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III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Most crime-scene evidence is not tested using forensic
analyses, and while forensic resources must be prioritized,
evidence is too often lost or not tested in important cases in which
it could play a useful role. Research suggests that important
forensic evidence collected at crime scenes often goes untested.42
Forensic evidence can go untested for a variety of reasons. There
may be no probative evidence to test or the case may be solved
through other means. There are cases, however, where due to
police neglect or insufficient laboratory resources, crime-scene
evidence that could be valuably tested is not. One study, for
example, found that 40% of unanalyzed rape and homicide cases
were estimated to have testable DNA evidence.43 Evidence may
not be collected from a crime scene in the first place; a large
percentages of cases, including sexual assault cases, do not have
evidence collected.44 There has been a real focus in recent years on
developing policies and procedures for crime-scene evidence
collection.45
Failure to collect and test evidence can lead to unsolved cases
as well as convictions of the innocent. There have been
exonerations of innocent people who were convicted because
laboratory analysts failed to test forensic evidence that could have
cleared them by the time of their trial. An example is the case of
Marlon Pendleton, who spent ten years in prison before he was

42. Joseph Peterson et al., The Role and Impact of Forensic Evidence in the Criminal
Justice Process 9 (June 10, 2010) (unpublished report), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/231977.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FSJ-XRWX] (“A major finding of the study was that
most evidence goes unexamined . . . .”); Kevin J. Strom & Matthew J. Hickman, Unanalyzed
Evidence in Law-Enforcement Agencies: A National Examination of Forensic Processing in
Police Departments, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 381, 391, 393 (2010) (“Approximately
14% of all the unsolved homicides reported during the 5-year period contained forensic
evidence that was not analyzed by a crime laboratory (an estimated 3,975 cases).
Approximately 18% of the unsolved rape cases were reported to contain forensic evidence
that had not been submitted to a laboratory (an estimated 27,595 cases) . . . . Overall, DNA
(40%) was the most common form of evidence contained in the unanalyzed cases.”).
43. Kevin J. Strom et al., The 2007 Survey of Law Enforcement Forensic Evidence
Processing 3-6 to 3-7 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished report), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/228415.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW9A-XSSV].
44. Peterson et al., supra note 42, at 14–15, 90.
45. See, e.g., NAT’L FORENSIC SCI. TECH. CTR., CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION: A GUIDE
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, at v (2013), https://www.nfstc.org/products/crime-scene-investig
ation-guide/ [https://perma.cc/A9LG-YF9D]; SUSAN BALLOU ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., THE BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE PRESERVATION HANDBOOK: BEST
PRACTICES FOR EVIDENCE HANDLERS, at iv (2013), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir
/2013/NIST.IR.7928.pdf [https://perma.cc/72W8-LA82].
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exonerated as a result of DNA evidence; at trial, the lab analyst
incorrectly testified that there was insufficient evidence to test.46
As the American Law Institute draft principles from the
Principles of Policing project emphasize, the limited availability of
resources only underscores the need for policy on the prioritization
of forensic testing. That policy must address the interaction of
police agencies and forensics agencies. Police and crime
laboratories may have different interests.
For example, agencies might adopt a rule providing that the
analysis of complex DNA mixtures is only conducted in the most
serious felony cases where such time-consuming work is justified.
Police may desire exceptions to such a rule. Laboratories may
encourage a policy based on when complex mixtures are
scientifically amenable to analysis. Because police and forensic
laboratories may have divergent interests, both should play a role
in setting policy.47
Another example of competing interests can be found in the
area of evidence submission. Clear rules are needed to govern
when evidence must be submitted for forensic testing; police can
overwhelm laboratories with evidence of insufficient quality for
analysis, or fail to collect potentially valuable evidence. Policies
can require an initial examination to reveal whether the evidence
is of sufficient quality to conduct further testing. Police may desire
faster results, but in higher priority cases, agencies may require
greater accuracy checks such as use of a second analyst to confirm
that the evidence is not of sufficient quality.
Currently, such practices may exist informally, and where
written policies do exist, they are not transparent. Most forensic
crime laboratories do not make their policies public.48
Traditionally, however, there has been a lack of both policy and
training for crime-scene evidence collection.49
46. Marlon Pendleton, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/
Marlon-Pendleton [https://perma.cc/GZ69-BFT3] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
47. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF POLICING (AM. LAW INST.) (Council Draft No. 4,
Chapter 9 on Forensic Evidence Gathering, Oct. 17, 2019).
48. Nicole Bremner Cásarez & Sandra Guerra Thompson, Three Transformative
Ideals to Build a Better Crime Lab, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1007, 1025–26, 1055–56, 1059
(2018).
49. Frank Horvath & Robert T. Meesig, A National Survey of Police Policies and
Practices Regarding the Criminal Investigation Process: Twenty-Five Years After Rand 75–
77 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished report), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/202902.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FZT6-FCV2] (“[I]n most agencies evidence-related duties are not assigned
predominantly to any one type of individual or position. Rather, they are more likely to be
shared among patrol officers . . . , investigators . . . , and evidence technicians . . . .”);
Laurin, supra note 2, at 1081–82.
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Some agencies implicitly prioritize: more labs in the past
decade have introduced more of a business and management
approach toward managing crime lab operations.50 Laboratories
may push requests forward when a policing agency tells the lab
that it is a high priority investigation. They may test evidence in
homicides or the most serious felonies first. They may send lab
scientists to crime scenes just in homicide cases. They may conduct
preliminary analyses to help decide whether more burdensome or
expensive testing is necessary or useful. Agencies may develop
procedures to halt work on cases that are dismissed in court, when
there is no longer a need to conduct costly testing; the North
Carolina State Crime Lab has developed such a process.51 They
may stop using certain forensic disciplines, such as handwriting
or bite mark comparisons, because they are too unreliable and not
worth the investment. They may substitute newer technologies for
older labor-intensive methods.52 They may outsource certain
technical forensics to labs with more expertise.53 In fact, this type
of approach has resulted in an almost total privatization of
forensic testing in the United Kingdom.54 Some laboratories have
undertaken efforts to improve their processes and efficiency.55
However, resource allocation and design decisions are
traditionally made ad hoc and without scientific input or a costbenefit analysis.
The following example of a focus on reducing costs at the
expense of maintaining benefits provides a cautionary tale. In the
50. Max M. Houck et al., FORESIGHT: A Business Approach to Forensic Science
Services, 2 FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y & MGMT. 85, 86 (2009) (“The need for training and support
in forensic laboratory management has been recognized for many years . . . , but little has
been done to transition the tools of business to the forensic laboratory environment.”).
51. N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NORTH CAROLINA STATE CRIME LABORATORY ANNUAL
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2016-2017, at 13 (2017) (“The State Crime Lab continues its
concerted effort to identify cases that have been disposed of in court (‘stop-work cases’) and
no longer need forensic analysis.”), https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/JLO
CJPS/Reports/FY%202017-18/DOJ_Annual_Crime_Lab_Report_FY_2016-17.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/AY9Q-YTS5].
52. See Julian et al., supra note 9, at 220 (“The questions of how effective one
methodological approach is over another or the synergistic effects of combined
methodologies have yet to be answered. Investment in infrastructure, personnel and future
research into new techniques can be more effectively allocated if the value it will obtain can
be predicted.”).
53. Chris Maguire et al., Efficiency and the Cost-Effective Delivery of Forensic Science
Services: Insourcing, Outsourcing, and Privatization, 3 FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y & MGMT. 62,
67–68 (2012).
54. Julian et al., supra note 9, at 226.
55. Paul J. Speaker, Process Improvement and the Efficient Frontier: Forecasting the
Limits to Strategic Change Across Crime Laboratory Areas of Investigation, 8 FORENSIC SCI.
POL’Y & MGMT. 109, 109 (2017).
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United Kingdom, as previously noted, crime laboratory functions
were largely privatized over the past two decades. In the course of
adopting a “fully marketized approach,” there was an estimated
60% reduction in spending on forensic testing.56 The focus in
England and Wales has been on the cost of each forensic test and
turnaround times, rather than on the quality of analysis or on
research, as documented by the House of Lords Science and
Technology Committee in a 2019 report.57
A second example illustrates the connection between resource
allocation and quality control in considering whether to adopt a
new forensic technology, as well as the tension between law
enforcement and laboratory interests. Congress enacted the Rapid
DNA Act of 2017 to subsidize the use of rapid DNA testing, which
can cost as little as half of what a lab-based DNA test costs.58 As it
increases in use and scale, the costs may continue to drop. Rather
than requiring a lab analysis, rapid DNA testing machines can be
used at a crime scene by a fairly untrained police officer. Police
may prefer to get a rapid DNA result without having to wait and
consult a lab. Yet, these rapid DNA tests are of unknown
reliability; the few studies done to validate the equipment suggest
an inability to examine mixed samples and a high percentage of
cases in which evidence is consumed.59 The result could harm
serious investigations. Laboratories would be correct to raise
scientific concern regarding such tests. Indeed, a number of
agencies (including the entire State of Texas, based on a decision
by the Texas Forensic Science Commission) have declined to use
rapid DNA tests for that reason; it may be fast and cheap, but it
risks accuracy and integrity of evidence.60
56. R.M. Morgan & E.A. Levin, A Crisis for the Future of Forensic Science: Lessons
from the UK of the Importance of Epistemology for Funding Research and Development,
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, Sept. 9, 2019, at 243, 244.
57. Id. at 244–45 (citing SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
FORENSIC SCIENCE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, 2017–
19, HL 333, at 7, 17 (UK)).
58. Ian Brown, The Literal and Figurative Costs of Rapid DNA, N.C. J.L. & TECH.
(Sept. 13, 2017), http://ncjolt.org/literal-figurative-costs-rapid-dna/ [https://perma.cc/FZS4HRVL].
59. See Heather Murphy, Coming Soon to a Police Station Near You: The DNA ‘Magic
Box,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/science/dna-crimegene-technology.html [https://perma.cc/4GN8-TW5Y].
60. Id. (noting opposition by the National District Attorneys Association, which said
that it “does not support the use of Rapid DNA technology for crime-scene DNA samples
unless the samples are analyzed by experienced DNA analysts”); Paul J. Weber, Texas Says
DNA Technology Jeopardizes Cases, SEATTLE TIMES (June 19, 2019, 9:57 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/apnewsbreak-texas-says-rapid-dna-supplier-jeopar
dizes-cases/ [https://perma.cc/626N-XPBR] (noting that the Commission “sent a letter
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Legislation can help to redirect crime lab policy and inform
both police and crime laboratories. In specific settings, legislation
has already done so, although not always by considering costs and
benefits. In response to the serious problem of the nontesting of
evidence in sexual assault cases, and with federal grant support,61
twenty-six states have enacted statutes requiring inventories of
untested evidence from sexual assault cases.62 All but two of these
statutes were enacted after 2014.63 Inventories conducted under
these laws have uncovered thousands of cases with untested
evidence.64 The concern regarding untested sexual assault kits
may reflect not only the seriousness of the crimes, but the
relatively low cost of DNA testing. One analysis suggests a high
societal return from a policy that requires DNA testing in sexual
assault cases.65 Indeed, in some states, submitting DNA tests in
sexual assault cases is required.66 Such a rule may avoid the
nontesting of DNA caused by negligence or a mistaken view that
a test could not provide probative information. On the other hand,
the rule may result in needless testing in cases in which DNA tests
would be irrelevant.
It is noteworthy how often legislation and policy do not
address decisions of whether to test evidence, when to audit
testing, how to prioritize testing, and how to allocate costs. If
empirically informed decisions were already being made, then we
could have some confidence that further oversight is unnecessary.
At the present time, we cannot have such confidence.
IV. QUALITY CONTROL
The National Academy of Sciences summarized the state of
affairs facing forensics in the United States in 2009: “Forensic
science facilities exhibit wide variability in capacity, oversight,
asking ANDE to ‘cease any project in Texas involving the use of its Rapid DNA
technology’”).
61. The SAFER Act of 2013 authorizes the use of grants under the Debbie Smith DNA
Backlog Grant Program to conduct audits of sexual assault evidence and requires the
Attorney General to publish information from audits online. SAFER Act of 2013, Pub. L.
No. 113-4, § 1002, 127 Stat. 127, 127–29. See also Sexual Assault Kit Initiative (SAKI),
BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=117
[https://perma.cc/2ASV-N5LF] (last visited Oct. 13, 2019) (explaining how federal grant
programs, such as SAKI, help to address crime lab backlogs).
62. GAO, DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 36, at 24.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 45.
65. Paul J. Speaker, The Jurisdictional Return on Investment from Processing the
Backlog of Untested Sexual Assault Kits, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, Feb. 20, 2019, at 19, 21.
66. GAO, DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 36, at 26 n.47.
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staffing, certification, and accreditation across federal and state
jurisdictions.”67 The focus here is not on the reliability or validity
of particular forensic techniques, but rather on quality control
systems for laboratories. There is a lack of “rigorous mandatory
certification and accreditation programs, adherence to robust
performance standards, and effective oversight.”68 The result has
been a series of quality control crises in which entire laboratories
have been shut down or audited in a range of jurisdictions around
the country due to lack of standardization, failure to disclose
probative results, rampant errors, and outright fraud. A number
of labs have had to conduct substantial retrospective audits due to
such quality control failures.69 Wrongful convictions have resulted
from these failures.70 Too many laboratories “lacked quality
control measures that would have detected the questionable
evidence.”71
There is little federal regulation of quality control in crime
laboratories despite extensive federal grant support for those labs.
To participate in the federal DNA databank, laboratories must
meet quality assurance standards.72 Such standards do not exist
as a barrier to receiving federal funding generally, except that for
Coverdell grants, labs are required to put in place independent
auditing mechanisms.73 However, an audit by the Office of the
Inspector General found that the Office of Justice Programs (OJP)
was not requiring recipients to actually comply with those
requirements.74 There was no response to this audit, except that
the federal government reacted by providing labs with examples
of how they could meet the requirement in the future.75

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
Id. at 6.
See id. at 44–45.
See id.
Id.
See FBI, QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR FORENSIC DNA TESTING
LABORATORIES (Sept. 1, 2011); FBI, QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR DNA
DATABASING LABORATORIES (Sept. 1, 2011).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 3797k(4) (2012).
74. See Oversight of the Justice for All Act: Hearing on S. 110-873 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4–6 (2008) (statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, I-2008-001,
REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS’ PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE
IMPROVEMENT GRANTS PROGRAM 7 (2008), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/OJP/e0801/fi
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6EZ-AUR4].
75. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1121-0329,
SOLICITATION: PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENT GRANTS PROGRAM 5–8
(2010), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl000921.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QJH-F6RX].
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Accreditation is an essential part of quality control, although
it is also not sufficient by itself to ensure minimally adequate
quality. Accreditation means that “the laboratory adheres to an
established set of standards of quality” and procedures. “An
accredited laboratory has in place a management system that
defines the various processes by which it operates . . . , monitors
that activity, and responds to deviations from the acceptable
practices using a routine and thoughtful method.”76 Accreditation
can also require periodic proficiency testing of individual
examiners.77
No federal accreditation system exists in the United States.
Some states require that their labs be accredited, but it is
otherwise voluntary.78 The National Commission on Forensic
Science (NCFS) strongly recommends that all Forensic Science
Service Providers (FSSPs) become accredited. Doing so can
promote compliance with industry best practices, promote
standardization, and improve the quality of services provided.79
The American Bar Association similarly has recommended that
“[c]rime laboratories and medical examiner offices should be
accredited, examiners should be certified, and procedures should
be standardized and published to ensure the validity, reliability,
and timely analysis of forensic evidence.”80 Accreditation has
become far more common among crime laboratories in the United
States. In 2014, nearly nine in ten (88%) of “the nation’s 409
publicly funded forensic crime laboratories were accredited by a
professional forensic science organization.” This number was up
from “82% in 2009 and 70% in 2002.”81 Eighty-three percent of
crime labs held an international accreditation standard in 2014.82
“International accreditation programs are based on the
76. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 195.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (2017) (“All forensic laboratories . . .
shall be accredited . . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 299C.157 (2019) (“A forensic laboratory . . . must
(1) be accredited by an accrediting body . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-683 (2001) (“[A]ll
forensic DNA laboratories performing work on behalf of the state or a political subdivision
shall be accredited . . . .”).
79. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIVERSAL
ACCREDITATION 1 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/624026/download
[https://perma.cc/ED84-72SL].
80. AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE
INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 47 (2006).
81. ANDREA M. BURCH ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 250152,
PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES: QUALITY ASSURANCE PRACTICES, 2014,
at 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pffclqap14.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2WZP9C8].
82. See id. at 3.
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International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and have
more rigorous requirements than noninternational standards.”83
“Since 2009, the proportion of crime labs with an ISO-based
accreditation standard increased from 27% to 83%.”84
Sound quality control also requires that forensic practitioners
be “certified in all categories of testing in which examinations are
performed . . . provided a certification examination is available.”85
The certification of individuals complements accreditation, and
like accreditation, it is a useful step but not sufficient to ensure
that proficient examiners are conducting forensic work. Other
professionals in the fields of science and technology, such as
“nurses, physicians, professional engineers, and some
laboratorians, typically must be certified before they can
practice.”86 The idea of certification finds support in the forensics
community, including the Technical Working Group on Forensic
Science Education and the International Association for
Identification.87 Analyst certification is more common. In 2014,
72% of “crime labs employed at least one externally certified
analyst,” up 12% from 2009.88
Cognitive bias is only now becoming a central part of quality
control at crime laboratories. Psychological research has shown
that, where forensic techniques involve some degree of judgment
and interpretation, experts are vulnerable to cognitive bias.89
Adoption of procedural protections can reduce such bias. For
example, a linear sequential approach has been developed for
comparative pattern disciplines. The PCAST Report recommends
this approach for latent fingerprint comparisons: “Examiners
should be required to complete and document their analysis of a
latent fingerprint before looking at any known fingerprint and
should separately document any additional data used during their
comparison and evaluation.”90 A second protection is to ensure
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIEWS OF THE
COMMISSION: CERTIFICATION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE PRACTITIONERS 2 (2016).
86. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 208.
87. Id. at 209.
88. BURCH ET AL., supra note 81, at 1.
89. PCAST REPORT, supra note 3, at 31 (“Studies have demonstrated that cognitive
bias may be a serious issue in forensic science.”).
90. Id. at 10; see also Itiel E. Dror et al., Context Management Toolbox: A Linear
Sequential Unmasking (LSU) Approach for Minimizing Cognitive Bias in Forensic Decision
Making, 60 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1111, 1111 (2015) (describing how to manage potential bias in
examining reference samples); Dan E. Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of
Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006,
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that potentially biasing task-irrelevant information is not passed
on to lab analysts.91 As the NCFS explains: “Information is taskirrelevant if it is not necessary for drawing conclusions about the
propositions in question, or if it assists only in drawing conclusions
from something other than the physical evidence designated for
testing or by some means other than an appropriate analytic
method.” Separation of roles within a laboratory can help keep
task-irrelevant information from biasing analysts.92
Blind testing can provide an integral part of an effective
quality assurance program. It is one of many measures used by
laboratories to monitor performance and to identify areas in which
improvement may be needed. A testing program is a method of
verifying that the laboratory’s technical procedures are valid and
that the quality of work is being maintained. As the NAS Report
explains:
There are several types of proficiency tests, with the primary
distinction among them being whether the examiner is
aware that he or she is being tested (an open or declared test)
or does not realize that the sample presented for analysis is
a test sample and not a real case (a blind test). Tests can be
generated externally, by another laboratory (sometimes
called an interlaboratory test), or internally. Another type of
testing involves random case reanalysis, in which an
examiner’s completed prior casework is randomly selected
for reanalysis by a supervisor or another examiner.93
Blind testing can determine the performance of individual
analysts, monitor laboratories’ continuing performance, and
“identify problems in laboratories and initiate remedial actions.”
Such actions may, for example, relate to individual staff
performance or systemic issues such as the calibration of
instrumentation or “the effectiveness and comparability of new
tests or measurement methods.”94
The following illustrates the state of testing in U.S. crime labs
during the last two decades:
In 2014, 98% of crime labs conducted [staff] testing, which
was similar to 2009 (97%) and 2002 (97%). As in previous
1006 (2008) (explaining that analysts’ exposure to information about the suspects may give
rise to confirmatory bias).
91. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENSURING THAT
FORENSIC ANALYSIS IS BASED UPON TASK-RELEVANT INFORMATION 4 (2015), https://www.
justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/818196/download [https://perma.cc/GE4F-S552].
92. See Dror et al., supra note 90.
93. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 207.
94. Id.
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years, nearly all (95%) crime labs evaluated the technical
competence of employees through declared examinations.
The percentage of crime labs that conducted random case
reanalysis in 2014 (35%) was similar to that reported in 2009
(34%), but a decrease from 2002 (54%). The proportion of
crime labs conducting blind examinations decreased from
27% in 2002 to 10% in both 2009 and 2014.95

All accredited DOJ FSSPs are required to participate in a
proficiency testing program.96
Much of the existing testing is not rigorous enough. “Although
many forensic science disciplines have engaged in . . . testing for
the past several decades, several courts have noted that . . . testing
in some disciplines is not sufficient[].”97 Labs themselves often do
not have good information about the performance of their analysts.
Performance testing can assess the methods used, the accuracy of
individual examiners, and lab systems and processes.98 For tests
designed to measure accuracy, in particular, it is important for
tests to be representative of the challenges of forensic casework. It
is equally important for test takers to utilize standard operating
procedures when performing testing. Test results can be a
valuable tool in guiding new research. Test providers should be
willing to share their data in the aggregate. They also should
strive to collect demographic data and method/process information
and should employ standard report wording to enable a
meaningful review of the population’s results as an indicator of the
strength of the proficiency test or the competence of the forensic
community as it relates to that test (e.g., methodology or
technology used).99
Moreover, some crime laboratories have not assumed
responsibility for carefully correcting all errors, such as notifying
legal actors that errors were made. Errors include inaccurate
results, failures to follow procedures, and nonconformities, as well
as misconduct by staff. The quality control process is intended to
help a lab identify problems. In response to errors, one important
international standard, ISO 17025, recommends only that the lab

95. BURCH ET AL., supra note 81, at 4 (citation omitted).
96. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECOMMENDATION TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: PROFICIENCY TESTING 1 (2016).
97. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 206.
98. See HUMAN FACTORS COMM., ORG. OF SCI. AREA COMMS., DRAFT GUIDANCE ON
TESTING THE PERFORMANCE OF FORENSIC EXAMINERS 1–2 (2018), https://www.nist.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/2018/05/21/draft_hfc_guidance_document-may_8.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NP7P-F59B].
99. See id. at 8–18.
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“address the consequences.”100 An agency, however, should go
beyond addressing the consequences of an error in some undefined
way by adopting an explicit rule that staff must remediate the
error, nonconformity, or misconduct. This must include notifying
counsel and the court to ensure justice.
V. THE ROLE OF REGULATION
The problems of resource allocation and quality control should
be viewed as connected. Each of these quality control efforts—from
policy and procedures concerning testing and prioritizing evidence
to crime scene collection, accreditation, and blind verification and
testing—cost something. We often know not what they cost but
must consider the alternative cost of poor resource allocation and
inadequate quality controls, which may result in untested or
poorly tested evidence. False negatives, where no correct match is
made, are a common forensic error, as are false inconclusive
results.101 The failure to connect evidence to crimes may go
undetected but can create enormous social costs.
The costs of errors are not normally factored into the
management of a crime lab as they are for a corporation, medical
laboratory, or hospital. Indeed, information about errors typically
does not exist for crime laboratories as it does for clinical
laboratories. In 1967, Congress enacted the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Act (CLIA) to ensure that all federally funded
medical labs conducted accurate tests.102 Over the years, the blind
testing requirements of that legislation have been strengthened.103
Nothing of the kind exists for forensics in the United States,
although other countries have adopted testing regimes.104
An exception is Dr. Peter Stout from the Houston Forensic
Science Center (HFSC), who has posed the question of how
100. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO/IEC 17025:2017(E), GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPETENCE OF TESTING AND CALIBRATION LABORATORIES, at
8.7.1.a (2017).
101. See Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, The Proficiency of Experts, 166 U.
PENN. L. REV. 901, 919–20, 930 (2018) (discussing results from commercial proficiency
tests).
102. Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 536
(1967) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
103. See Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578,
102 Stat. 2903; 42 C.F.R. § 493.1 (2014) (establishing regulatory requirements laboratories
must meet to perform human specimen testing); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV.,
WHAT DO I NEED TO DO TO ASSESS PERSONNEL COMPETENCY? 2 (2012), https://www
.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/CLIA_CompBrochure_5
08.pdf [https://perma.cc/VFB4-RTFD].
104. See Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 101, at 955, 957–58.
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accurate a crime laboratory must be to justify its costs. He has
asked whether a system that makes an error one in a hundred
times is good enough. Given the stakes, Stout has described how
he is aiming for a one in five thousand system.105 Conducting blind
tests, which the HFSC seeks to do in 5% of its cases, costs between
$500,000 to $1 million per year.106 However, as Stout explains,
crime labs seek to prevent both costly crimes and wrongful
convictions. And these accuracy checks mean that he can say with
95% confidence that the error rate is less than 0.2%.107 Further, a
single error that results in a wrongful conviction, like the George
Rodriguez case, could cost $9 million, and a murder that occurs
due to delay in testing could result in costs of $5 million to $14
million.108 While making all of these improvements to processes
and quality controls, the HFSC has made quality related
documents and its processes public.109 Rebuilding the lab from the
ground up as an independent corporation permitted the lab to
adopt a more management-oriented approach toward forensics.
Regulation could help guide forensics by requiring that such
costs and benefits be used in a more considered fashion. Funding
could be allocated in ways that satisfy public priorities for police
agencies and crime laboratories. Funding could support the use of
such quality programs to both improve accuracy and prevent
backlogs or failure to test evidence due to shoddy work. Currently,
the priorities are largely focused on expanding capacity for certain
types of testing at the expense of others and without making
quality control or research a priority. Tellingly, federal funds may
not be used for such quality controls, or more generally, for
research that might improve the use of forensics. Many of the
existing federal grants can only be used to reduce backlogs and
implement new technologies and processes.110 As a result, the
percentage of crime labs that do any research is small; in 2014,
only 14% of publicly funded crime labs had any resources
dedicated to research.111

105. Dr. Peter Stout, President & CEO, Hous. Forensic Sci. Ctr., The Recovery of
Houston at the 2017 International Forensic Science Error Management Symposium (July
24, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2017/07/2017-international-forensicscience-error-management-symposium [https://perma.cc/S64G-A44Z].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 4–5.
111. BURCH ET AL., supra note 81, at 6.
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Federal and state regulations can create and monitor quality
standards. The NAS Report described an urgent need for forensic
science research, national scientific standards, and stronger
oversight and quality control of our entire system of forensics. The
report called for Congress to create and fund a National Institute
of Forensic Science. Those recommendations were never followed.
To be sure, a full cost-benefit analysis concerning the creation of
the National Institute of Forensic Science was never conducted by
the National Academy of Sciences Committee, which admitted
that it was “not in a position to estimate how much it will cost to
implement the recommendations in this report.”112
In recent years, however, the federal government has
increased funding for forensic science research through the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).113 NIST
created a large research collaborative named the Center for
Statistics and Applications in Forensic Evidence (CSAFE) that
conducts research on everything from fingerprint and shoe print
statistics to jury behavior, and has formed new collaborations with
crime labs.114 NIST also began to convene a large set of scientific
working groups to develop standards for all of the forensic
disciplines called the Organization of Scientific Area Committees
(OSAC), but that process has proceeded fairly slowly and resulted
in few standards.115 The NCFS “provided an essential forum . . . to
improve
the
forensic
sciences[,]”
and
issued
many

112. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 13, 53, 81–82, 203, 206; Rebecca McCray, Jeff
Sessions’ Rejection of Science Leaves Local Prosecutors in the Dark, SLATE (June 7, 2017,
9:45 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/06/disbanding-the-ncfs-will-lead-to-wor
se-outcomes.html [https://perma.cc/KF3Y-R4U2] (reporting on the defunding of the NCFS
which was created partially in response to the report before enacting recommended
standards).
113. See NIST Appropriations Summary FY 2017 – FY 2019, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS
& TECH. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/director/congressional-and-legislative-affair
s/nist-appropriations-summary-fy-2017-fy-2019-0 [https://perma.cc/5MGY-HQ6T].
114. Alicia Carriquiry, CSAFE: Center for Statistics and Applications in Forensic
Evidence, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/20
16/12/05/csafe_center_for_statistics_and_applications_in_forensic_evidence.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/FAD6-9XZJ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020); Susan M. Ballou, Focus on the Evolution of
Forensic Evidence, 6 VA. J. CRIM. L., no. 2, 2018, at 14, 17.
115. The Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, NAT’L INST.
STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/topics/organization-scientific-area-committeesforensic-science [https://perma.cc/2BXP-4MLE] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020); ASA’s
Comments on Forensic Science in Response to Request for Information on the Development
of the Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) for Forensic Science 2.0, AM.
STAT. ASS’N (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/POL-OSAC2_RFI_FIN
AL.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP87-ZZAJ].
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recommendations until it was shut down in January 2017 with
“work to be done.”116
At the state level, thirteen states and Washington D.C. have
created forensic science commissions: Arkansas, Delaware,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington.117 Few of these groups, however, actually conduct
oversight of forensic methods and work. Only the Missouri, Texas,
and Washington commissions and the Washington D.C. Science
Advisory Board, themselves review complaints.118 Others delegate
the investigatory responsibilities, conduct accreditation, or consist
of advisory bodies that meet infrequently.119 Most recently,
Massachusetts and Michigan are considering creating
commissions that would set standards, investigate the validity of
forensic techniques, and investigate and report on any errors or

116. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REFLECTING BACK—
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE 5, 10 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file
/959356/download [https://perma.cc/75YB-5J3T].
117. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-301 to 302 (creating a State Crime Laboratory
Board); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1501.02, .11–.14 (West Supp. 2012) (creating a Science
Advisory Board and Stakeholder Counsel to supervise the Department of Forensic
Sciences); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4714 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 17-2A12 (LexisNexis 2009) (establishing a Forensic Laboratory Oversight Committee); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 650.059.1 (West Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-61 (LEXIS through Session
Laws 2018-146 of the 2018 Regular Session and the 1st, 2d, and 3d Extraordinary Sessions
of the General Assembly); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-5 (Supp. 2013) (establishing the DNA
identification system oversight committee); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-a(1) (McKinney 2013);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.1-3 (2002) (establishing the State Crime Laboratory Commission);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-1109(A), -1110(A)(1), (4) (2012); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.01 § 1; WASH. REV. CODE § 43.103.030 (2019) (establishing the Washington state forensic
investigations council); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.156 (West 2007) (establishing a Forensic
Laboratory Advisory Board) (repealed 2014); FORENSIC SCI. DIVISION, MONT. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2017), https://media.dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017-FSDAnnual-Report-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TNK-V4GK].
118. D.C. CODE § 5-1501.12(1) (West Supp. 2012) (providing that the Science Advisory
Board shall “[r]eview all reports of allegations of professional negligence, misconduct, or
misidentification or other testing error that occurred . . . at the Department [of Forensics]”);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.059.1 (West Supp. 2013) (providing for “independent review of any
state or local Missouri crime laboratory receiving state-administered funding”); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01 § 4(a)(3) (stating that the commission shall “investigate, in a
timely manner, any allegation of professional negligence or professional misconduct that
would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a forensic analysis conducted by a
crime laboratory”); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.103.090(1)(g) (2019) (providing the state forensic
investigations council the power to “[d]o anything, necessary or convenient, which enables
the council to perform its duties and to exercise its powers”).
119. For an overview of responsibilities of state forensic science commissions, see
FORENSIC TECH. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, STATE FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSIONS 14, 16, 32–
35, 38 (2016), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1440422/nij-report-state-forensic-sciencecommissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/QGS4-4DKZ].
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negligence at crime labs.120 Such commissions could take on a
larger guiding and regulatory role, and could ensure that more
information is released concerning quality incidents, case flow,
and budgets. In the past, such commissions have not done so.
VI. CONCLUSION
A very small fraction of the approximately $2 billion spent
annually on forensics just at public crime laboratories is dedicated
toward quality controls and improving processes in forensics.
Instead, funding has been directed toward expanding capacity,
reducing backlogs, and increasing submission to federal forensics
databanks.121 The result has been predictable: growing capacity
but larger backlogs and insufficient quality control. Labs have
grown bigger, all too often without becoming better. Instead,
resources should be directed to studying which forensic techniques
produce benefits that justify their costs. We should know far more
about how crime labs are performing and what their budgets
consist of. Crime labs and forensics work is a prominent part of the
criminal justice system. Its costs, benefits to the public, and
quality should all be the subject of far more study and public
information.
We cannot improve laboratories if they remain a black box
regarding methods, performance of analysts, budgets, and results.
Police agencies, which for too long were not evidence-informed,
provide the wrong entity to supervise crime laboratories, as many
have observed.122 However, public safety and law enforcement
interests should be taken into account just as those of crime
laboratories. Without information about cost and benefits or
policies in place to guide decision-making, we cannot begin the
process of making forensic management more evidence-informed.
We expect sound science from our forensic laboratories. The same
scientific methods should inform how we manage laboratories to
best serve the interests of justice.

120. S. 2371, 189th Gen. Court (Mass. 2018); H.R. 6026, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2018).
121. For a discussion of the federal interest in database expansion, see Abrams &
Garrett, supra note 25, at 778–83.
122. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 44; see also THOMPSON, supra note 6, at
86–87.

